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Credit Ratings in Insurance Regulation:  The 
Missing Piece of Financial Reform 
John Patrick Hunt* 
Abstract 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 directed federal financial regulators to remove credit ratings from 
their rules, but had nothing to say about the use of credit ratings by state 
insurance regulators.  This omission is significant because insurers own 
nearly twice as many foreign, corporate, and municipal bonds as banks do.  
During the 2000s, state insurance regulators came to rely increasingly on 
rating agencies rather than the regulators’ in-house valuation office to 
assess the credit risks of these holdings. 
After the perceived widespread failure of ratings in the crisis, the 
insurance regulators did undertake a review of their use of ratings in 
regulation.  This review, which has been going on for over two years, does 
not seem to be on a path to eliminate the use of credit ratings in insurance 
regulation.  The one decisive action regulators have taken in this area, 
ceasing reliance on credit ratings on mortgage-backed securities in favor of 
a standard more favorable to the industry, seems to be an example of what I 
call a "rule bailout"—an ad hoc regulatory rule change to benefit a 
struggling industry during a crisis. 
The increasing dependence on outsourced credit ratings under 
industry pressure during a boom, rule bailout during a crisis, and 
subsequent reconsideration of the use of credit ratings suggests a political 
cycle of financial regulation, in which significant reform is feasible only in 
the aftermath of crisis.  This cycle complicates several leading technical 
proposals for improving capital regulation and may limit what we can 
expect from the project of financial regulation generally. 
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I.  Introduction 
One of the few financial reforms on which Republicans and Democrats 
in Congress have agreed is the elimination of credit ratings from financial 
regulation.  Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 ordered federal financial authorities to 
excise credit ratings from their regulations within one year,1 and the House 
Republicans’ alternative draft financial regulation bill contained a similar 
provision.2  Dodd-Frank’s sweeping and unequivocal command was 
noteworthy not just for its bipartisanship, but also because it seemed to 
resolve at one stroke a struggle over the proper use of credit ratings that had 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 § 939A (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 2. See Consumer Protection and Regulatory Enhancement Act, H.R. 3310, 111th 
Cong. §§ 602–603 (2009) (providing for elimination of credit ratings from federal financial 
regulation within three months of enactment).  Despite agreement on this particular point, 
most Republicans in Congress voted not to enact Dodd-Frank.  See U.S. House of 
Representatives, Final Results for Roll Call 413 (June 30, 2010), available at 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/roll413.xml (last visited Nov. 25, 2011) (showing that, in 
final vote on the Dodd-Frank Act in the House, 173 Republican members voted Nay, 3 voted 
Yea, and 2 did not vote) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also U.S. 
Senate, U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress Second Session (July 15, 2010), 
available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm? 
congress=111&session=2&vote=00208#position (last visited Nov. 25, 2011) (showing that, 
in final vote on the Dodd-Frank Act in the Senate, 38 Republicans voted Nay and 3 voted 
Yea) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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been going on for at least fifteen years.  Law professors,3 financial 
economists,4 and even some of the rating agencies themselves5 had been 
criticizing the regulatory use of ratings since the mid-1990s with little to 
show for their efforts.  Section 939A might have seemed like a sudden and 
complete, if unexpected, victory for the reformers. 
But Dodd-Frank, definitive as it was in ordering an end to the use of 
credit ratings in federal financial regulation, had nothing to say about the 
use of ratings in the state-based insurance regulatory system.  It is as though 
the financial reformers forgot about insurance, the industry that owns about 
20% of the corporate and foreign bonds6 and 16% of the municipal bonds in 
the United States,7 and that bears a corresponding amount of the credit risk 
that rating agencies assess and regulators monitor.  By comparison, banks 
own about 7% of corporate and foreign bonds8 and 9% of municipal bonds9 
outstanding. 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets? Two Thumbs 
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 623 (1999) (arguing that 
incorporation of credit ratings into regulation "has encouraged the rating agencies to shift 
from the business of providing valuable credit information to the far more lucrative business 
of selling regulatory licenses.").  Partnoy explains that  
the new regulatory scheme has had dramatic effect, not only causing a decline in 
the informational value of credit ratings, but also creating incentives for the 
agencies to provide inaccurate ratings and for market participants to pay for 
regulatory entitlements stemming from the agencies’ ratings, instead of paying 
for the informational content of the ratings. 
Id. 
 4. See Financial Economists Roundtable, Statement on Reforming the Role of the 
Statistical Ratings Organizations in the Securitization Process (Dec. 1, 2008), at 2 ("[T]he 
FER [Financial Economists Roundtable] challenges the wisdom of incorporating SRO 
[rating agency] ratings in securities and banking regulations issued by governmental 
entities."). 
 5. See Thomas McGuire, Moody’s Investor Servs., Ratings in Regulation:  A Petition 
to the Gorillas 1 (Apr. 28, 1995) ("Moody’s . . . recommends that use of ratings be phased 
out of financial regulation, such that the sole judge of the quality of rating opinions will 
again be the investors who bear the risks of fixed-income investment."). 
 6. Fed. Reserve Bd., Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States:  Flows and 
Outstandings Second Quarter 2011, FED. RES. STATISTICAL RELEASE Z.1, Sept. 16, 2011, at 
93 tbl.L.212 (figure derived by summing holdings of property-casualty insurance companies 
and life insurance companies). 
 7. Id. at 92 tbl.L.211 (same derivation). 
 8. Id. at 93 tbl.L.212 (figure derived by summing holdings of  U.S.-chartered 
commercial banks, foreign banking offices in the U.S., bank holding companies, banks in 
U.S.-affiliated areas, and savings institutions). 
 9. Id. at 2 tbl.L.211 (same derivation). 
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This Article explores the previously unexamined use of credit ratings 
by state insurance authorities, who have jealously guarded their primary 
authority over insurance regulation from Congressional intrusion for sixty-
five years.10  Part II of the Article traces the rise of rating-dependent 
regulation of insurance and the displacement of the state insurance 
regulators’ in-house public rating capability by private credit rating 
agencies in the 2000s.  Part II reviews how the failure of financial products 
that had received high credit ratings stressed the industry during the 
financial crisis. 
Part III examines the insurance regulators’ reconsideration of their use 
of credit ratings in response to the crisis.  Regulators have studied the 
problem for years, starting in February 2009, but their study and analysis 
has led to only limited proposals to reduce reliance on ratings.  Even if all 
proposals pending today are adopted, the insurance regulation system will 
continue to be heavily rating-dependent.  The insurance regulators’ 
continued embrace of credit ratings is important on its own, because it 
threatens to defeat the purpose of Dodd-Frank’s directive to remove ratings 
from federal financial regulation:  Artificial regulatory demand for ratings 
will continue, and credit rating agencies’ decisions will continue to exert 
outsized influence through the regulatory system.  Insurance regulators’ 
continued reliance on credit ratings also is important because it illustrates 
how reluctant regulators are to give up using these measures of credit 
quality, which are readily available and are, for better or worse, widely 
recognized.  In fact, Congress recently learned the hard way just how 
attached the federal financial regulators are to credit ratings, as these 
authorities missed Dodd-Frank’s one-year deadline for eliminating credit 
ratings. 
Part IV examines one very important exception to the general 
proposition that insurance regulators have acted only slowly and cautiously.  
This exception is the regulatory treatment of residential and commercial 
mortgage-backed securities.  After the mass rating downgrades of mortage-
backed securities in the financial crisis, regulators moved swiftly on 
industry’s request to abandon credit rating agencies and to give these 
securities more favorable regulatory treatment so that the industry would 
not have to raise more capital.  The timing, low visibility, and industry-
                                                                                                                 
 10. See Robert W. Klein, The Insurance Industry and Its Regulation:  An Overview, in 
THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 13, 32–36 (Martin F. Grace 
& Robert W. Klein eds., 2009) (describing states’ struggle to retain authority to regulate 
insurance in the years since the Supreme Court recognized federal authority to regulate the 
industry in United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944)). 
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friendly nature of this action suggests that it is better understood not as a 
principled reaction to the problems of rating-dependent regulation, but 
rather as an example of what I call a "rule bailout"—an ad hoc rule change 
by regulators to benefit the regulated industry when the industry is under 
stress.  Although explicit bailouts that put government funds at risk have 
received much more attention than rule bailouts, rule bailouts arguably are 
more insidious and dangerous.  They attract less attention than explicit 
bailouts.  And when a rule bailout allows an industry to change rules that an 
industry sought the moment those rules become inconvenient—as 
apparently happened in the case of the insurance industry—rule bailouts 
promote unfairness and moral hazard. 
Part V situates the rule bailouts of insurance and other segments of the 
financial industry in the broader context of the political cycle of financial  
regulation.  If the large, powerful financial industry is cyclical in nature and 
the political will to regulate it exists only  in the aftermath of crisis, then 
efforts to constrain regulatory discretion or strengthen regulators are limited 
in what they can accomplish.  Even if the scope of financial regulation is 
understood broadly, to encompass the ex post reallocation of the gains and 
losses from the financial cycle in the interest of justice, such an approach is 
limited by the difficulty of identifying the gains and losses to be allocated, 
except in the broadest terms.  Thus, what we can expect from the overall 
project of financial regulation may be limited. 
Part VI concludes, arguing that despite the insurance regulators’ 
valuable and empirical work, we simply do not know at this point whether 
these regulators should abandon credit ratings in favor of any particular 
alternative.  Even if the analytically correct answer were clear, it might be 
irrelevant because of the insurance industry’s preference for private credit 
ratings and its apparent power over its own regulation. 
II.  The Rise of Rating-Dependent Regulation of Insurance 
One of insurance regulation’s main goals is reducing the likelihood 
that insurers will fail to meet policyholders’ claims due to insolvency,11 and 
insurance law seeks to control the risk that insurers will become insolvent 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE M. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND 
INSURANCE 106 (10th ed. 2008) ("Clearly, a primary focus on insurance regulation is on 
insurer solvency.  Indeed, it has been argued that this should be the primary function of 
regulation."). 
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due to investment losses.12  It employs two tools to this end:  investment 
holding limits, which require insurers to hold investments that meet some 
standard of safety,13 and capital requirements, which require insurers to 
maintain prescribed levels of capital as a margin of safety against 
insolvency.14 
Credit risk—used here to refer to the risk that an insurer’s investments 
will go into default or otherwise not pay as agreed—is especially important 
for insurers, who often hold investments for a long period of time to satisfy 
liabilities that will arise in the distant future, such as life-insurance claims 
on a pool of currently middle-aged policyholders.15  Banks and brokers, by 
contrast, may be more concerned about liquidity risk—the risk that all their 
creditors will demand repayment at once.16  This was the risk that brought 
down so many institutions during the financial crisis.17 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See id. at 108 (discussing how and why "the insurance code of each state spells out 
the particular investments permitted to each type of insurance company in the state"). 
 13. Investment holding limits are prescribed by state statute and vary widely from 
state to state.  In the 1990s, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) 
attempted to establish a model law for investment holdings.  The effort ran into difficulties, 
and ultimately resulted in two model laws reflecting two different philosophies about proper 
investment limits.  In 1996, NAIC promulgated the Model Investment Act (Defined Limits 
Version), which lists permitted investments one by one and forbids non-listed investments 
(the "pigeonhole" approach).  See 3 NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES 
280-1, §§ 3–32 (2011).   In 1997, NAIC promulgated the Model Investment Act (Defined 
Standards Version), which permits any investment that meets a general standard of prudence 
in the context of the insurer’s portfolio (the "portfolio" approach).  See id. 283-1, §§ 1–19 
(2011).  Most states have not enacted either of NAIC’s model laws.  See id. 280-1, State 
Adoption (showing adoption of the Model Investment Act (Defined Limits Version) by 
seventeen states); id. 283-1, State Adoption (showing adoption of the Model Investment Act 
(Defined Standards Version) by one state).  The major insurance-regulating states are 
divided between the "pigeonhole" and "portfolio" approaches.  Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 38a-102(a) (2011) (stating that, subject to exceptions, an insurance company may make 
such investments "as are prudent in respect of the business of said insurance company and 
diversification considerations"), with N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 1404–05 (prescribing lists of 
permitted investments for life and non-life insurers).  
 14. The NAIC’s Risk-Based Capital Model Act requires insurers to follow risk-based 
capital rules adopted by NAIC.  See 3 NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES 
312-1, § 2.A (2011) (stating that domestic insurers must submit an annual report outlining 
the extent of their risk-based capital).   
 15. See GUILLAUME PLANTIN & JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, WHEN INSURERS GO BUST 2, 
90–96 (2007) (contrasting the credit risks of the banking industry with those that insurers 
face).  Moreover, if insurer solvency benefits parties other than owners or creditors, one 
might not expect owners or creditors to bargain hard to protect the interests of these third 
parties. 
 16. See id. at 2 (explaining how banks by their very nature are subject to "runs").  
Banks, of course, are also concerned with credit risk. 
 17. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 
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Both the tools insurance law uses to control insurers’ financial risk are 
designed to help manage credit risk.  Investment holding limits restrict 
insurers to instruments with lower credit risk, and capital requirements are 
calibrated to account for the greater losses that instruments with greater 
credit risk are likely to suffer:  riskier instruments are more likely to suffer 
large losses, so they require a larger capital cushion. 
As a simple example of capital requirements,18 consider an insurance 
company with $1,000 in assets.19  If it is subject to a 10% capital 
requirement, then the insurer must maintain $100 in capital and thus can 
have only $900 in liabilities.  If the company is subject to a 30% capital 
requirement, then the insurer must maintain $300 in capital and thus can 
have only $700 in liabilities.  The insurer’s owners must supply the capital, 
so the requirement determines how much money the owners must put up to 
maintain a business of a given size (as measured by assets).  The difference 
between having to hold 10% of asset value as capital and having to hold 
30% as capital is the difference between being able to run a $1,000 business 
with $100 and $300, respectfully, of one’s own money.  It is also the 
difference between being able to sustain 10% and 30%  of losses before 
becoming insolvent, at least in an accounting sense. 
One might expect creditors, such as insurance policyholders, to 
demand that insurers maintain such a safety cushion, and one might 
likewise expect insurers to maintain such a cushion in order to be able to 
stay in business when they suffer investment losses.  The insurer might not 
hold as much capital as the creditors would like, or as much as 
policyholders would bargain for if they were not diffuse.20  Even so, capital 
                                                                                                                 
291 (2011) (detailing Bear Stearns’s failure after "runs" and how regulators permitted Bear 
to operate with "insufficient liquidity"); see also id. at 343 (citing "runs" and "reliance on 
short-term funding" as causes of the failure of Lehman Bros.); id. at 355 (recounting the runs 
on Washington Mutual, Wachovia, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch in 
the wake of Lehman’s failure). 
 18. See generally Memorandum from Acad. Joint RBC Task Force, Am. Acad. of 
Actuaries, to Lou Felice, Chair, NAIC Risk-Based Capital Task Force (Feb. 12, 2002) 
[hereinafter AAA Feb. 12, 2002 Memo], available at http://www.actuary.org/pdf/ 
finreport/jrbc_12feb02.pdf (describing insurance risk-based capital requirements consistent 
with this example). 
 19. The phrase "$1,000 in assets" can mean different things because not all assets are 
similarly valued. In applying the risk-based capital rules, financial assets may be valued at 
amortized cost or at the lower of amortized cost or market, with lower-risk assets valued at 
cost and riskier ones valued at the lower of cost or market.  For life insurers, only assets in 
the lowest NAIC category, NAIC-6, are carried at the lower of cost or market.  Id. § iii at 1.  
The "Detailed Grid—2001 Asset Risk Factors" delineates how each of the three formulas 
handle the various risk elements faced by Life, P&C, or Health companies. 
 20. See PLANTIN & ROCHET, supra note 15, at 27–28 (stating that the diffusion of 
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requirements constrain the freedom of the firms that are subject to them, 
and firms that are subject to capital regulation—whether insurers, banks, or 
brokers—chafe at and seek to circumvent their restraints.  Regulators and 
the regulated constantly struggle over the formulation and application of 
capital requirements.  
The body charged with developing capital rules for the insurance 
industry is the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), 
an association of state insurance regulators that was founded in 1871 and 
counts all states’ regulators as members.21  The NAIC’s Risk-Based Capital 
Model Law, which has been adopted in all states but Texas, requires state 
regulators to follow the NAIC’s risk-based capital guidelines.22  
An organization within the NAIC—the Securities Valuation Office 
(SVO), created in 190723—historically has been charged with assessing the 
credit risk of insurance company investments.  The SVO maintains its own 
rating scale, running from 1 (least risky) to 6 (most risky).  The NAIC’s 
capital rules are keyed to this 6-point scale:  the difference between an 
NAIC-1 and an NAIC-6 rating on a $1,000 bond owned by a life insurer 
apparently is the difference between holding $3 and $195 in capital against 
the bond.  For property/casualty insurers, the difference in capital required 
is even more stark—the charge is $3 for NAIC-1 and $300 for NAIC-624 
The SVO, which is funded by assessments on insurance companies,25 
apparently has relied on rating agency ratings as a starting point or 
benchmark for its assessments for a long time, because the SVO has not had 
the staff and resources to do its own credit analysis for every instrument 
                                                                                                                 
insurance policies among policyholders results in "the absence of a tough, sophisticated 
claimholder" who could attempt to negotiate for the insurer to maintain a larger capital 
cushion). 
 21. VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 11, at 105. 
 22. See 3 NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES 312-1, § 2.A (2011).  
The Risk-Based Capital Model Act has been adopted almost universally, unlike the NAIC’s 
model acts on investment limits.  See id. 312.17-21, at § 15 (providing a chart reflecting 
adoption of the Risk-Based Capital Model Act in all states but Texas).  Even Texas requires 
compliance with NAIC’s risk-based capital rules except where they conflict with express 
provisions of state law.  28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 7.402 (2010) (incorporating the NAIC 
Risk-Based Capital guidelines into the law by reference). 
 23. See Partnoy, supra note 3, at 700 n.367. 
 24. AAA Feb. 12, 2002 Memo, supra note 18, § iii at 1. 
 25. See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, NAIC Waives $790,000 Industry 
Assessment (Feb. 8, 2005), available at http://www.naic.org/Releases/2005_docs/SVO_ 
Assessment_Waiver.pdf (noting that the $790,000 waiver was granted in accordance with an 
agreement that "called on the industry to pay a fixed assessment of $1.58 million in 2004" to 
offset lost SVO revenue). 
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owned by an insurer in the United States.  In 1998, an SVO staffer wrote 
that the SVO’s reliance on credit rating agencies was "essential to its 
productivity" because "covering the growing universe of structured 
securities simultaneously in a manner comparable to that of the [rating 
agencies] is not part of its mission."26  But the SVO retained authority to 
take a more pessimistic view on an instrument’s risk than the credit rating 
agencies.27 
This changed in 2000, when the NAIC adopted a provisional 
exemption for investment-grade corporate and municipal securities.  High 
agency ratings on corporate and municipal bonds were no longer subject to 
SVO review unless the state regulators requested such a review.28  In 2004, 
NAIC adopted the "filing exempt" rule (FE Rule), which further constricted 
the SVO’s role by providing that any bond or preferred stock with a current 
rating from a recognized rating agency need not be filed with the SVO.29  
The NAIC thus permitted insurers to decide whether their holdings would 
be rated by the SVO or by rating agencies.  And insurers do 
overwhelmingly choose to rely on agency ratings:  80% of insurer holdings 
are rated by agencies rather than the SVO,30 and the 20% that the SVO does 
assess are overwhelmingly those that are not rated by the agencies.31 
Why did the NAIC decide to permit insurers to opt out of using its 
existing rating capability?  According to a report by the accounting and 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Frederic P. Vigneron, The NAIC Securities Valuation Office’s Analysis of Asset-
Backed Securities, in HANDBOOK OF STRUCTURED FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 99, 109 (Frank J. 
Fabozzi ed., 1998).  
 27. Id. 
 28. See Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Statement and Testimony by Chris Evangel 
Before the NAIC’s Working Group Public Hearing—Nov. 18, 2010 at 3, available 
at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_rating_agency_evangel_comments.pdf 
(commenting that insurance regulators adopted the exemptions for "reasons of 
efficiency and effectiveness"). 
 29. See Memorandum from Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Understanding the NAIC 
Filing Exemption (FE) Rule 1 (Feb. 25, 2004) (draft) 1, available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/svo_FE_FAQ.pdf (explaining that "recognized" agencies in 
this context are those that the SEC has designated "nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations"). 
 30. See Chris Evangel, Managing Dir., Sec. Valuation Office, Panel 1—Use of Ratings 
in Regulation, 11 (Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/ 
committees_e_rating_agency_090924_panel1_evangel.ppt (last visited Nov. 25, 2011) 
(giving a public hearing regarding the NAIC’s use of credit ratings) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 31. Interview with Chris Evangel, Managing Dir., Sec. Valuation Office, Sec. 
Valuation Office (June 29, 2010) (interview notes on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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consulting firm KPMG that NAIC commissioned in 1998, the SVO lacked 
the resources and budget to do much beyond rely on agency credit ratings 
in most cases anyway:  "SVO has difficulty completing an in-depth analysis 
on the more complex non-rated issues due to the large volume of 
submissions it receives, as well as limited qualified, trained staff available 
to perform the analysis."32  The consultants outlined two options:  a 
"massive increase in the budget and staff" of the SVO so that it could carry 
out the credit analysis it was supposed to carry out,33 or bypassing the SVO 
altogether for instruments with credit ratings.34  They recommended the 
latter, arguing that there was "little opportunity for the SVO to add value by 
conducting detailed independent credit reviews where a [rating agency] . . . 
has, or should have, already undertaken such analysis."35 
Commenters who argue that a public rating entity is the solution to the 
rating-agency problem36 should take heed of the fate of the SVO—an 
actual, functioning public credit rater bypassed by regulators who were 
apparently unwilling to charge industry enough to permit it to perform its 
function. 
III.  The Financial Crisis, the Ratings Crisis, and the Insurance Industry 
Of course, just a few years later, the ratings in which regulators of all 
stripes—not just state insurance regulators—had put so much stock were 
being blamed for a global financial crisis.  Specifically, since the beginning 
of the crisis there has been a widespread perception, shared, for example, 
                                                                                                                 
 32. KPMG PEAT MARWICK, REPORT ON REVIEW OF DUE DILIGENCE PRACTICES AND 
PROCEDURES OF THE SEC. VALUATION OFFICE 2 (1998). 
 33. Id. at 27. 
 34. See id. at 30 (recommending "eliminat[ing] the requirement for a complete SVO 
filing package for public NRSRO-related issues"). 
 35. Id. at 3.  The KPMG consultants went even further with a suggestion not adopted 
by the NAIC:  KPMG recommended that when an instrument is not rated by credit rating 
agencies, regulators should simply accept the insurer’s assessment of credit risk.  Id. at 30. 
 36. See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Industry:  An Industrial 
Organization Analysis, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
41, 41–42, 51–57 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002) (suggesting that safety-and-
soundness regulators take a more active role in regulatory judgments); see also Milosz 
Gudzowski, Note, Mortgage Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis:  The Need for a State-
Run Mortgage Security Credit Rating Agency, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 245, 248, 264–80 
(arguing that a government entity should replace credit rating agencies in rating residential 
mortgage-backed securities and residential-mortgage-backed-securities-collateralized debt 
obligations). 
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by both the majority and dissent in the 2011 Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission report,37 that ratings on "structured products"—financial 
products based on the performance of pools of mortgages and other debt 
obligations—were too high relative to the products’ actual risk, and that 
those high ratings had led investors to take on too much exposure to the 
high-rated products.38  A growing body of empirical research suggests that 
this perception is largely accurate.39 
Whether initial ratings were inflated or not, the eventual downgrades 
of complex, mortgage-based financial products and the market’s loss of 
confidence in these products were among the immediate causes of the 
failures of many large institutions during the financial crisis.40 
The U.S. insurance industry was not immune to the effects of 
widespread, large downgrades on securities initially rated as safe.  Most 
famously, the near-collapse of the titanic AIG seems to trace primarily to 
the decision of an offshore trading affiliate to write huge amounts of 
protection on structured products tied to U.S. housing.41  When AIG itself 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 17, at xxv (reporting the majority’s 
conclusion that "failures of credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of 
financial destruction"); id. at 418 (reporting the dissenters’ conclusion that "[f]ailures in 
credit rating and securitization transformed bad mortgages into toxic financial assets"). 
 38. See Manuel Adelino, Do Investors Rely Only on Ratings?  The Case of Mortgage-
Backed Securities 1, 36 (Nov. 24, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (finding that, for all 
ratings classes except AAA, yield spreads at time of issuance generally predicted default, 
even after controlling for ratings) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 39. See, e.g., ADAM ASHCRAFT ET AL., FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 
449, MBS RATINGS AND THE MORTGAGE CREDIT BOOM 1–5 (2010) (stating that ratings on 
residential mortgage-backed securities became more generous between 2005 and 2007 and 
underperformed a model that assessed default probability based on factors observable at time 
of security issuance); see also Efraim Benmelech & Jennifer Dlugosz, The Credit Rating 
Crisis 25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15045, 2009) (reporting that 
structured finance ratings underperformed corporate bonds in 2007–2008, with more 
frequent and more severe rating downgrades); Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, CMBS 
Subordination, Ratings Inflation, and the Crisis of 2007–2009 1–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 16206, 2010) (finding that rating-agency standards for 
commercial mortgage-backed securities fell from 1996 to 2007 at the same time that issuers 
were including smaller and smaller subordinated tranches to cushion the high-rated senior 
tranches, and that ratings required unrealistically small subordination tranches by 2005); 
Adelino, supra note 38, at 1, 36 (finding that, for all ratings classes except AAA, yield 
spreads at time of issuance generally predicted default, even after controlling for ratings). 
 40. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 17, at 226 (reporting that the failure 
or near failure of many large financial firms was the result of both the downgrading of 
mortgage-backed financial products by rating agencies and the panicking of investors). 
 41. See id. at 344–52 (describing the failure and rescue of AIG in a chapter titled 
"September 2008:  The Bailout of AIG"); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 945, 952–63 (2009) (describing in detail the causes of AIG’s 
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lost its AAA credit rating, that gave counterparties the right to demand 
collateral to cover potentially gigantic losses on the products AIG had 
insured.  The "bond insurance" industry was effectively destroyed in the 
financial crisis through its insurance of and investment in structured 
products.  When insured structured products defaulted at high rates, the 
resulting wave of claims against the bond insurers sank the entire industry. 
More prosaically, the mortgage insurance industry also teetered on the 
brink of collapse as mortgage defaults sparked gigantic payouts, with at 
least one important player, suffering regulatory takeover and bankruptcy.42 
These cases are idiosyncratic, however.  AIG’s case is 
unrepresentative, as most U.S. insurers are not affiliated with a gigantic 
offshore trading operation and AIG’s problems did not originate in affiliates 
subject to NAIC capital regulation.  The bond insurers’ case is 
unrepresentative because the entire industry is located in New York and is 
regulated by the New York State Department of Insurance, not the NAIC.  
Mortgage insurers’ losses stem primarily from their core business—
insuring mortgages—rather than their investments.  The crisis affected 
thousands of United States insurance companies, not just those that were 
affiliated with AIG or that were bond or mortgage insurers.43 
Those companies, including the bread-and-butter life, health, property, 
and casualty insurers that serve most Americans, generally have survived 
the crisis to date.44  So far, there have been no high-profile failures of 
life/health or property/casualty companies subject to the NAIC’s capital 
rules, and this may speak well of the effectiveness of the existing rules.   
But the industry did experience substantial stress, and that stress in fact 
prompted the NAIC’s most decisive regulatory change to date.  Life 
                                                                                                                 
collapse); see also John Patrick Hunt, Rating-Dependent Regulation of Insurance, 17 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 101 (2011). 
 42. See Marie Baudette, Mortgage Insurer PMI Group Files for Bankruptcy, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 25, 2011 (describing seizure of PMI’s mortgage insurance unit by Arizona 
regulators in October 2011, parent company’s unsuccessful legal challenge to seizure, and 
parent company’s subsequent bankruptcy filing). 
 43. See INS. INFO. INST., A FIRM FOUNDATION:  HOW INSURANCE SUPPORTS THE 
ECONOMY 1 (2010), available at http://www2.iii.org/assets/docs/pdf/A_Firm_Foundation_ 
20101.pdf (reporting that there were 2,741 property and casualty insurance companies and 
1,128 life/health insurance companies in the U.S. in 2008).  
 44. See Testimony of the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Ins., Housing, and Comty. Opportunity, Comm. on Fin. Servs., Nov. 16, 2011, at 2 
(statement of Joseph Torti III, Deputy Director and Superintendent of Insurance and 
Banking, Rhode Island Department of Business Regulation), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/111611torti.pdf (stating that "in 2009, 140 
banks failed, but only 18 insurers did"). 
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insurers owned over $145 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities 
as of year-end 2008,45 and the rating agencies’ downgrades of these 
securities in 2009 triggered a requirement that the industry raise capital—$9 
billion, according to the industry’s own estimate.46  As described below, it 
was the unattractive prospect of raising that capital that sparked the 
industry’s successful campaign to get the NAIC’s rating-based capital rules 
changed. 
The full effect of the mortgage exposure on the insurance industry is 
still unknown.  Mortgage-backed securities continue to suffer losses as 
borrowers default, and insurers’ losses are likely to be spotted later than 
banks’ because insurers’ investments are more likely to be held in 
categories that give the insurers discretion in deciding whether to recognize 
losses on their financial statements.  It seems premature for the insurance 
industry to declare victory over the mortgage crisis. 
But even if the industry never suffers high-profile insurer insolvencies, 
the ratings crisis was still serious enough to prompt not just the life 
insurers’ successful lobbying for a rule bailout, but also a comprehensive 
effort on the NAIC’s part to rethink its use of agency ratings in its capital 
rules from the ground up. 
Understanding that reaction is important even if it turns out that 
insurers have performed well under the NAIC’s supervision during the 
crisis.  First, insurers and their regulators are critically important ratings 
consumers, so any attempt to improve rating agencies by reforming rating-
dependent regulation must take into account what the NAIC is doing.  If the 
NAIC’s rules create artificial demand for ratings among insurers, then 
Congress’s attempt in the Dodd-Frank Act to eliminate artificial demand by 
excising ratings from federal rules will be incomplete.  Second, the NAIC’s 
experience has lessons for the design of financial regulation more generally.  
The rule bailout for regulatory constituents; the protracted reconsideration 
of rating-dependent regulation from first principles that has not lead to 
abandonment of ratings;  and the decision not to turn to public provision of 
ratings despite having the infrastructure in place to build such a capability—
                                                                                                                 
 45. See Letter from John Bruins & Andrew Melnyk, Am. Council of Life Insurers, to 
Michael Moriarty & Lou Felice, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Aug. 10, 2009 (stating that, at 
the end of 2008, life and health insurers held over $145 billion in residential mortgage-
backed securities) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  This figure excludes 
"agency" securities—those issued or guaranteed by government-sponsored housing 
enterprises.  See id. 
 46. See id. (estimating an increase in capital requirement from about $2 billion to $11 
billion). 
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these have significance beyond Dodd-Frank, and even beyond rating-
dependent regulation. 
IV.  Analysis Without Action:  NAIC’s Inconclusive Review of Rating-
Dependent Regulation 
The financial crisis spurred a widespread reconsideration of the use of 
credit ratings in financial regulation.  Incorporation of credit ratings into 
financial regulation, so the argument goes, both reduces the quality of ratings 
by creating artificial demand for ratings that is not based on market forces 
and increases the harm caused by poor quality ratings by elevating ratings’ 
importance. 
This was not a new idea.  Indeed, the leading rating agencies themselves 
were among the first critics of the use of ratings in financial regulation,47 
perhaps in part because the second-tier agencies got a competitive boost from 
government recognition of their ratings.  The agencies were followed by 
some professors of law.48  It was only after Enron retained an investment-
grade credit rating up until four days before its collapse49 that policymakers 
started to consider the idea of removing ratings from regulation along with 
other suggestions for reform of rating agencies.50 
Following years of study, the SEC and Congress decided not to scale 
back the delegation of regulatory authority to rating agencies, but rather to 
encourage market entry by new agencies in order to improve the agencies’ 
performance.51  That was the central point of the Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act of 2006 (CRARA).52  Some commenters have pointed out that 
                                                                                                                 
 47. McGuire, supra note 5, at 1. 
 48. See Partnoy, supra note 3, at 623–24 (arguing that rating-dependent regulation has 
transformed rating agencies from sellers of valuable information to sellers of "regulatory 
licenses" and urging replacement of credit ratings in regulation with credit spreads or other 
market measures).  Other law professors were unconvinced, even after Enron’s collapse.  See 
Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 65–66 (2004) ("While 
favorable regulatory treatment is clearly an important part of the value of obtaining ratings, 
ratings must be doing more."). 
 49. Hill, supra note 48, at 43. 
 50. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT 
RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS (2003) (describing post-
Enron inquiries into the role of credit rating agencies). 
 51. See id. at 28–29, 43–45 (identifying rating-dependent regulation as a potential 
issue but declining to consider it further, while identifying potential measures to reduce 
regulatory barriers to entry into the rating-agency market as an area for further study).  
 52. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 
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increased competition in the face of rating-dependent regulation might 
cause the agencies to perform worse by reducing the value of reputation 
and by strengthening issuers’ hand in shopping around for high ratings 
to satisfy regulatory requirements,53 but this line of thinking did not 
carry the day. 
The world never really got a chance to find out whether CRARA’s 
approach was misguided or not, because the financial crisis of 2007–
2009 was upon us before the Act had much of a chance to have any 
effect.  The SEC’s rules implementing the Act took effect in late June 
2007,54 scarcely one month before the Fed took the first of its 
extraordinary actions to address "dislocations in money and credit 
markets."55  The financial crisis refueled the critics of rating agencies 
and rating-dependent regulation because the failure of high-rated 
complex financial products was widely seen as a cause of the financial 
                                                                                                                 
1327 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (improving ratings quality by modifying 
practices in the credit rating agency industry).  The main point of CRARA was to reduce 
"artificial barriers to entry" by setting forth a transparent and relatively undemanding process 
through which the SEC could recognize a rating agency for regulatory purposes.  See S. REP. 
NO. 109-326, at 7 (2006) (stating that the registration process is the "most important[]" 
feature of Act); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a) (2006) (detailing the registration process); 
Hunt, supra note 41, at 115 n.58 (comparing the NAIC’s list of approved rating 
organizations to the SEC’s list of nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, and 
finding that NAIC’s list is a subset of the SEC’s list). 
 53. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Keith Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring 
Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 626–27 (1981) (arguing that cost 
competition erodes value of reputation); see also Patrick Bolton, Xavier Freixas & Joel 
Shapiro, The Credit Ratings Game 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
14712, 2009) (arguing that, compared with monopoly, duopoly facilitates rating shopping 
and inflation, leading to less efficient outcomes); Vasiliki Skreta & Laura Veldkamp, 
Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity:  A Theory of Ratings Inflation, 56 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 678, 679 (2009) (stating that where rated entities can choose which ratings to 
disclose, competition can lead to markets acting on excessively high ratings, even without 
conscious inflation); Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, Reputation and Competition:  Evidence 
from the Credit Rating Industry 14 (Feb. 12, 2009) (Working Paper) (finding, through 
empirical study, "a significant positive correlation between competition and credit ratings, 
suggesting that more competition pushes ratings toward the higher end of the rating 
spectrum"). 
 54. See Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organizations, 72 Fed. Reg. 33,564 (June 18, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 240, 249b) (adopting rules for implementing CRARA). 
 55. Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Aug. 10, 
2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20070810a.htm (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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crisis.  The SEC,56 Congress,57 and the G-20’s staff arm58 all undertook 
reviews of the regulatory use of credit ratings, as did the NAIC. 
In February 2009, the NAIC created a working group (the Working 
Group) to "gather and assess information on . . . [t]he problems inherent in 
reliance on ratings," as well as "[t]he reasons for recent rating 
shortcomings."59  The regulators’ decision to reconsider the use of credit 
ratings might have led them to abandon the use of private credit ratings 
altogether, perhaps with an orderly plan to phase out their reliance on the 
rating agencies.  The regulators might have decided to replace the private 
raters by reinvigorating the SVO, or even transforming the SVO into a 
public rating agency.  Indeed, one might have expected the state insurance 
regulators to be the most likely of all regulators to eliminate rating-
dependent regulation entirely because, uniquely among regulators, they had 
a public rating capability—albeit a dormant one60—at their disposal. 
Contemporary observers believed that such a decisive move was at 
least possible,61 and when the SVO presented a set of regulatory options to 
the Working Group, its own upgrade was (perhaps unsurprisingly) at the 
                                                                                                                 
 56. References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 
73 Fed. Reg. 40,088 (proposed July 11, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 
249); Security Ratings, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,106 (proposed July 11, 2008) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 239, 240); References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Securities 
Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,124 (proposed July 11, 2008) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 270, 275). 
 57. See supra Part II (discussing Congress’s attempt to excise credit ratings from 
financial regulation through the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 58. See FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON 
ENHANCING MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE 37–38 (2008) (calling for review of 
how investors use ratings in regulation); see also FIN. STABILITY BD., PRINCIPLES FOR 
REDUCING RELIANCE ON CRA RATINGS 1 (2010) ("Standard setters and authorities should 
assess references to credit rating agency (CRA) ratings in standards, laws and regulations 
and, wherever possible, remove them or replace them by suitable alternative standards of 
creditworthiness."). 
 59. MICHAEL MCRAITH, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, EVALUATING THE RISKS 
ASSOCIATED WITH NAIC RELIANCE ON NRSRO CREDIT RATINGS – FINAL REPORT OF THE 
RATING AGENCY WORKING GROUP TO THE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS COMMITTEE 1 (2010) 
[hereinafter RAWG FINAL REPORT], available at http://www.naic.org/documents/ 
committees_e_rating_agency_report_adopted_by_e_committee.pdf. 
 60. See Evangel, supra note 30 (indicating that SVO ratings are used for only 20 
percent of insurers’ holdings) (percentage computed by author). 
 61. See Sean P. Carr, NAIC Seeks to Form Its Own Rating Agency, A.M. BEST 
NEWSWIRE, (Oct. 20, 2008) (discussing the NAIC’s plans for developing its own rating 
agency) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also RAWG FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 59, at 5 (stating that agency ratings "have a role in regulation"). 
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top of the list.62  Perhaps 2010 would see the adoption of a public 
alternative to private rating agencies. 
It was not to be.  The idea of an NAIC-run rating entity promptly 
attracted "concern" from insurers, who reportedly "worr[ied that] a new 
levy on insurance companies . . . would send the wrong signal to the 
industry, particularly in the current climate."63  The idea of strengthening 
the SVO as a replacement for private rating agencies faded from view in 
successive drafts of the Working Group’s report, along with the idea of 
completely abandoning rating-dependent regulation.  The Working 
Group’s recommendation in December 2009 to "Eliminate or Modify the 
Filing Exempt Rule"64 became a recommendation in April 2010 to 
"Modify the Filing Exempt Rule."65  December’s "consider the possibility 
of establishing an SVO-like entity as a not-for-profit rating agency"66 
became April’s "[c]onsider whether the NAIC should establish a not-for-
profit rating agency where ARO [private rating agency] coverage is not 
adequate."67  The recommendation that "ARO ratings should no longer be 
used to set RBC for structured securities"68 disappears entirely and the 
final report expressly provides that "ARO ratings have a role in 
regulation."69 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMS., STAFF REPORT:  NAIC USE OF NRSRO RATINGS IN 
REGULATION 3 (2009), available at www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_rating_agency_ 
comdoc_naic_staff_report_use_of_ratings.doc (suggesting that the NAIC "[c]onsider 
replacing NRSRO ratings with alternative NAIC SVO analytical processes" as lead potential 
reform approach) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 63. Sean P. Carr, Insurers Concerned About NAIC Pursuit of Its Own Rating Agency, 
A.M. BEST NEWSWIRE, Apr. 20, 2009 (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 64. MICHAEL MCRAITH, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, EVALUATING THE RISKS 
ASSOCIATED WITH NAIC RELIANCE ON NRSRO CREDIT RATINGS – EXPOSURE DRAFT REPORT 
OF THE RATING AGENCY WORKING GROUP TO THE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS COMMITTEE 7 
(2009) [hereinafter RAWG EXPOSURE DRAFT] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 65. RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 6.  The report recommends including "the 
use of market information on price direction and of yield trends in addition to ARO ratings 
for some or all filing exempt securities" in addition to making new investment products and 
certain classes of structured securities ineligible for filing exemption.  See id. 
 66. RAWG EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 64, at 5 
 67. RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 5 (emphasis added). 
 68. RAWG EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 64, at 7. 
 69. RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 5.  The Working Group goes on to 
qualify this statement by recommending that the use of ARO ratings in regulation be 
supplemented by alternative risk assessment benchmarks in order to better address the full 
spectrum of risks represented in an insurer’s portfolio.  See id. 
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Although the Working Group retreated from the ideas of materially 
strengthening the SVO and/or completely eliminating rating-dependent 
regulation, its final report did reflect considerable dissatisfaction with the 
status quo.70  In its final report, the Working Group found that "policy on 
the use of ARO ratings should be highly selective"71 and it identified ten 
separate issues for further study by various committees and task forces 
within the NAIC with a view toward reducing regulators’ use of ratings.72 
As of late November 2011, the NAIC’s process continues.  Groups 
within NAIC have completed studies of the performance of ratings on 
corporate issuers during the financial crisis (generally acceptable, but 
financial issuers fared poorly);73 of the performance of municipal, 
corporate, and structured bonds relative to rating over time (municipal 
bonds have outperformed their ratings; structured bonds have 
underperformed their ratings);74 and of possible alternatives to credit 
ratings.75  The NAIC is considering specific proposals to stop relying on 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See id. at 2–4 (emphasizing that rating-dependent regulation exposes the insurance 
regulatory process to risks arising from competitive pressures on AROs and that certain 
assumptions upon which ARO ratings rely have proved to be unreliable) 
 71. Id. at 5. 
 72. See id. at 4–6.  
 73. See Proposed Methodology to Assess the Reliability of NRSRO Credit Ratings, 
Memorandum from Bob Carcano, Senior Counsel, Sec. Valuation Office, Nat’l Ass’n Ins. 
Comm’rs, to Matti Peltonen, Chair, Valuation of Sec. Task Force, Nat’l Ass’n Ins. Comm’rs 
2–3 (Oct. 8, 2010), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_vos_ 
exposure_staff_reports_ra_wg_carcano_nrsro_ratings.pdf  ("For non-financial issuers on the 
whole, none that were rated investment grade at the end of 2008 defaulted in 2009.  None 
that were rated A or higher at the end of 2006 defaulted by the end of 2009.") (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 74. See Analysis of the Performance of NRSRO Credit Ratings and Implications of 
Default Statistics Associated with NAIC Designations, Memorandum from Bob Carcano, 
Senior Counsel, Sec. Valuation Office, Nat’l Ass’n Ins. Comm’rs, to Matti Peltonen, Chair, 
Valuation of Sec. Task Force, Nat’l Ass’n Ins. Comm’rs 3 (Oct. 10, 2010) [hereinafter SVO 
Rating Performance Analysis], available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ 
e_vos_exposure_staff_reports_ra_wg_carcano_nrsro_ratings_analysis.pdf (finding that 
current NAIC designations overstated default risk relative to corporate issuers and 
understated default risk for structured securities) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 75. See Alternatives and Supplements to the Use of NRSRO Credit Ratings, 
Memorandum from Bob Carcano, Senior Counsel, Sec. Valuation Office, Nat’l Ass’n Ins. 
Comm’rs, to Matti Peltonen, Chair, Valuation of Sec. Task Force, Nat’l Ass’n Ins. Comm’rs 
1–2 (Oct. 8, 2010) [hereinafter SVO Rating Alternatives Report], available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_vos_exposure_staff_reports_ra_wg_carcano_
nrsro_ratings.pdf (presenting a methodology for analyzing credit ratings) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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agency credit ratings for general obligation municipal bonds76 and to 
make adjustments to agency ratings for structured securities.77 
But there is no indication that the NAIC plans anything approaching 
the complete elimination of credit ratings from its regulations.  NAIC 
recognizes three major categories of bonds—corporate, municipal, and 
structured.78  Even if all the proposals currently pending before NAIC are 
adopted, ratings will continue to be important in each of these categories.  
For corporate bonds, there is no proposal to change the NAIC’s reliance on 
ratings, so agency ratings apparently will continue to be taken at face value.  
For municipal bonds, agency ratings presumably will continue to be used 
for revenue bonds (those backed by specific projects), even if they are 
abandoned for general obligation bonds (those backed by the full faith and 
credit of government entities).79  For structured bonds, agency ratings 
apparently will continue to be the starting point for analysis, even if NAIC 
adopts rules calling for the ratings to be adjusted.80 
It is unclear what will emerge from the lengthy project the NAIC has 
undertaken to reevaluate and selectively reduce its use of credit ratings.  
What does seem likely, however, is that the NAIC will neither completely 
eliminate ratings from its regulatory system nor substantially displace the 
private agencies by expanding the SVO.  The report that finds that ratings 
on municipal, corporate, and structured products are not comparable 
                                                                                                                 
 76. See Robert Carcano & Hankook Lee, The Revised Recalibration Proposal, Aug. 3, 
2011, at 1, 13, available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_capad_ 
vos_c1_factor_review_sg_related_docs_svo_proposal_attachment4.pdf (arguing that agency 
ratings overstate default risk for municipal general obligation bonds and proposing an NAIC 
designations for such bonds that do not rely on agency ratings). 
 77. As of November 2011, NAIC was considering a final proposal to adjust rating-
based designations for structured bonds.  See Revised Draft Amendment to Purposes and 
Procedures Manual to Provide Final Instructions for Modeled and Non-Modeled Securities, 
Nov. 7, 2011, at 11 (providing for adjustment of preliminary rating-based NAIC 
designations for structured bonds, upward if carried at a discount to par and downward if 
carried at a premium to par) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Revised 
Instructions Flowchart, Nov. 7, 2011 (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  NAIC also is considering a proposal to require different amounts of risk-based 
capital for different types of structured securities based on the historical performance of 
those securities.  For example, structured securities based on health care receivables, which 
historically have had high credit losses, would require more capital than structured securities 
based on aircraft leases, which have performed better.  See Carcano & Lee, supra note 76, at 
2, 14. 
 78. See Carcano & Lee, supra note 76, at 1–2 (discussing the three categories). 
 79. See id. at 14 (proposing retention of agency-rating based system for municipal 
bonds other than general obligation bonds). 
 80. See sources cited supra note 77. 
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suggests recalibrating SVO’s rating-based scale, not replacing the ratings.81  
The report on credit-rating alternatives presents a sample scheme in which 
agency ratings account for fifty percent of the credit risk assessment (with 
market prices and non-rating financial strength measures accounting for the 
rest) and the SVO’s role is to monitor "anomalous" situations in which 
other measures of credit disagree.82 
The state insurance regulators’ retreat to a highly selective approach to 
reforming rating-dependent regulation stands in contrast to Congress’s 
bold, broad-stroke decision to eliminate rating-dependent regulation 
entirely by mandating that  each federal finance regulator "shall modify [its 
regulations] to remove any reference to or requirement of reliance on credit 
ratings."83 
The contrast suggests an immediate consequence of insurance 
regulators’ retention of rating-dependent regulation.  If the insurance 
regulators maintain rating-dependent regulation, then Dodd-Frank’s 
purpose in eliminating credit ratings from federal financial regulation will 
be substantially frustrated.  According to the theory that apparently 
underlies Dodd-Frank, rating-dependent regulation blunts rating agencies’ 
incentives to produce high-quality ratings by creating demand for all 
ratings, of high or low quality.  Supposing this to be true, rating-dependent 
state regulation will continue to harm rating quality even if credit ratings 
are stripped out of federal regulations—which may or may not happen, as 
the federal financial regulators, along with bank lobbyists, apparently are 
resisting this requirement.84  This is important because insurance is 
important.  But beyond that, poor-quality ratings affect the public because 
private actors use them, not just because regulators use them.  Correcting 
rating agencies’ incentives for quality by removing ratings from federal 
regulation makes little sense as long as the rating agencies’ most important 
                                                                                                                 
 81. See SVO Rating Performance Analysis, supra note 74, at 13–15 (recommending 
that "three separate NAIC designation frameworks be developed for corporate, municipal, 
and structured securities"). 
 82. See SVO Rating Alternatives Report, supra note 75, at 5.  Although this idea is 
presented only as an example and not as a formal proposal, it is the most concrete suggestion 
in the report and thus may suggest the author’s perception of what is likely to garner support.  
See id.  
 83. Dodd-Frank Act § 939A (emphasis added). 
 84. See Jean Eaglesham & Deborah Solomon, Why Credit Raters Keep Their Power, 
WALL. ST. J., Nov. 16, 2010, at C1 (reporting that John Walsh, acting Comptroller of the 
Currency, has stated that Dodd-Frank "goes further than is reasonably necessary" and that 
Sheila Bair, chairman of the FDIC, has warned that finding an alternative to credit ratings "is 
going to be very, very difficult"). 
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regulatory customers—the state insurance regulators—continue to use 
them.  The Dodd-Frank project of fixing rating-dependent regulation will 
remain radically incomplete without much more aggressive changes at the 
state level. Thus, the regulatory use of ratings promises to become an 
important new front in the longstanding battle over state versus federal 
control of insurance regulation. 
The difference is probably explained in part by the fact that the NAIC 
process is driven by the regulators who will actually have to regulate 
without relying on credit ratings.  The perspective of the reformer of credit 
rating agencies conflicts with that of the financial regulator.  Reformers ask, 
"What is wrong with rating agencies?"  The answer, "They are a 
government-sponsored oligopoly," is appealing across the ideological 
spectrum, as the political parties’ agreement on the issue suggests.  
Regulators, on the other hand, ask, "How should we go about judging risk?"  
There, the answer, "Use the same credit rating agencies the market does," is 
appealing.  The decision of Congress—which was at least temporarily 
under the sway of the reformers—to end federal rating-dependent 
regulation makes the conflict in perspectives acute. 
Using credit rating agencies is appealing to financial regulators for two 
sets of reasons:  political and substantive.  Using ratings is politically 
appealing because it serves the parochial interests both of regulators and of 
the regulated:  The regulators get to defer responsibility (and blame) for 
credit assessments to the rating agencies.  The regulated insurers don’t have 
to pay a lot for regulatory assessments of ratings, because most instruments 
have a credit rating paid for by the issuer in place.  Moreover, the insurers 
get to keep decisions about creditworthiness in the private sector. 
Some of the political problems with eliminating rating-dependent 
regulation may apply with particular force to insurance, but regulators’ 
desire to use credit ratings is not confined to insurance.  For example, in 
July 2008 the SEC proposed an aggressive cutback of its historically heavy 
reliance on credit ratings.85  But, as of mid-February 2011, the SEC had not 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,088 (proposed July 11, 2008) (proposing "to amend various 
rules and forms under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . that rely on NRSRO ratings") 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249); Security Ratings, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,106 
(proposed July 11, 2008) (proposing "to replace rule and form requirements under the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that rely on security 
ratings . . . with alternative requirements") (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229–30, 239–40); 
References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 40,124 (proposed July 11, 2008) (proposing "to amend five rules under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 that rely on NRSRO 
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taken action on the most important aspects of its proposals.86  And banking 
regulators are leading the charge against Dodd-Frank’s requirement to 
eliminate ratings from financial regulation.87  Insurance regulators’ 
reluctance to abandon the use of ratings is just a particularly telling example 
of a general regulatory tendency that simultaneously highlights the political 
case for Dodd-Frank’s outright ban (Congress must act decisively because 
regulators won’t) and undercuts the substantive case for such a ban. 
Rating-dependent regulation is substantively appealing because the 
alternative ways of measuring risk—using market prices, insurer models, or 
third parties other than rating agencies—are not terribly attractive.88  
Market prices are volatile and are not always available.  More 
fundamentally, market prices reflect credit risk along with many other 
factors, and the "other factors"—market liquidity and investor risk 
aversion—become critical when a crisis strikes.89  Risk assessments 
conducted by insurers themselves suffer from fairly obvious conflicts of 
                                                                                                                 
ratings") (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 275). 
 86. See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,358 (Oct. 9, 2009) (adopting a final rule removing some 
references to credit ratings from its rules) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249, 
270); References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Rating Orgs., 74 Fed. Reg. 52,374 
(proposed Oct. 9, 2009) (reopening comment on more significant proposed changes to SEC 
rules) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229–30, 239–40, 242, 249, 270, 275); Sec. Ratings, 76 
Fed. Reg. 8,946 (proposed Feb. 16, 2011) (reopening comment on significant proposals in 
wake of the Dodd-Frank Act) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 200, 229–30, 232, 239–40, 249); 
Asset-Backed Sec., 75 Fed. Reg. 23,328 (proposed May 3, 2010) (proposing a rule that 
would eliminate reliance on ratings in determining whether asset-backed securities are "shelf 
eligible") (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 229–30, 232, 239–40, 243, 249). 
 87. See Eaglesham & Solomon, supra note 84, at C1 (noting that banking industry 
organizations share the view that eliminating all use of ratings from federal financial 
regulation is overkill, and advocating for the continued use of some ratings); see, e.g., Letter 
from Kenneth E. Bentson Jr., Exec. Vice President, Pub. Policy & Advocacy Sec. Indus. & 
Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., at 2–3 (Oct. 25, 2010) 
("Credit Rating should be a permissible input in any replacement standard.") (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Letter from Mary Frances Moore, Vice President, Office 
of Regulatory Policy, to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., at 1 (Oct. 25, 2010) 
("[W]e would encourage the agencies to adopt a standard that would employ credit ratings as 
one possible (albeit not mandatory) factor in determining the creditworthiness of an asset.") 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 88. See generally Memorandum from Bob Carcano, Senior Counsel, Sec. Valuation 
Office, to Matti Peltonan, Chair of the Valuation of Sec. Task Force (Oct. 8, 2010) 
(reviewing alternatives to agency credit ratings and reaching similar conclusions) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 89. See John Patrick Hunt, One Cheer for Rating Agencies: How the Mark-to-Market 
Accounting Debate Highlights the Case for Rating-Dependent Capital Regulation, 60 S.C. 
L. REV. 749, 775–77 (2009). 
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interest.  Although regulators could oversee the insurers’ models, this 
approach failed spectacularly for the Wall Street investment banks in the 
financial crisis.90  Non-rating-agency third parties—being private entities 
that provide credit opinions in return for compensation—aren’t clearly an 
alternative to rating agencies. 
V.  Action Without Analysis:  The "Rule Bailout" of Life Insurers 
In contrast to the slow progress on principled reform of rating-based 
regulation, regulators took swift and decisive action on another front:  
granting capital relief to life insurers after credit rating agencies 
downgraded the insurers’ holdings of mortgage-backed securities.  The life 
insurers’ argument in favor of this capital relief was reasonable (if 
contested in its factual specifics by the rating agencies), but the timing of 
the request and the regulators’ action suggest that the action is fruitfully 
analyzed as a "rule bailout"—an ad hoc change to industry rules during a 
crisis to avoid harsh consequences to the industry. 
As of year end 2008, the life insurance industry’s $145 billion in 
mortgage-backed security holdings was associated with a capital 
requirement of $2 billion.91  The amount of the capital requirement strongly 
suggests that the securities held by life insurance companies, like the 
overall population of mortgage-backed securities, overwhelmingly had 
received high, or "investment-grade" ratings.92  After rating agencies 
downgraded 64% of AAA-rated residential mortgage-backed securities 
below investment grade, life insurers’ capital requirements increased to $11 
billion. 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 17, at 151–54 (describing the failure 
of SEC’s Consolidated Supervised Entity program for capital regulation of the large 
investment banks). 
 91. See Letter from John Bruins & Andrew Melnyk, Am. Council of Life Insurers, to 
Michael Moriarty & Lou Felice, NAIC, 3 (Sept. 10, 2009) [hereinafter ACLI Sept. 10, 2009 
Letter] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 92. "Investment-grade" typically refers to instruments that receive ratings of AAA, 
AA, A, or BBB on the rating scale used by Standard & Poor’s and Fitch. (Moody’s uses 
slightly different notation from the other major agencies, and investment grade covers the 
Aaa, Aa, A, and Baa categories per Moody’s scale). These ratings correspond to the top two 
designations,  NAIC-1 and NAIC-2, on the insurance regulators’ scale. Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. 
Comm’rs, supra note 28, at 6. Life insurers are required to hold 0.4% capital against NAIC-
1 instruments and 1.3% capital against NAIC-2 instruments.  Id. at 7.  So, the $2 billion 
capital requirement against $148 billion in holding corresponds closely to an NAIC-2 rating. 
Id.  
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In August 2009, the American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) argued 
that the capital rules based on agency credit ratings—ratings that the 
insurers chose to use—required insurers to hold too much capital against 
mortgage-backed securities.  The ACLI argued that it was inappropriate to 
rely on credit ratings in computing capital requirements applicable to 
mortgage-backed securities, because agency ratings are based "primarily on 
the likelihood of the first dollar of loss" and did not take severity of loss 
into account.93  A mortgage-backed security with a 5% chance of default 
received the same rating whether the expected loss in case of default was 
10% or 100%. 
NAIC adopted ACLI’s proposal to switch away from agency ratings in 
October 2009.94  NAIC did not return the risk assessment function to the 
SVO, but instead contracted with a private, third-party provider, one that is 
not a rating agency, to assess the credit risk of mortgage-backed securities 
using a methodology that takes into account the severity of loss.95  As 
NAIC later reported, the switch reduced the insurance industry’s 2009 
capital requirement by $5.4 billion.96 
NAIC undertook this action in a proceeding that received remarkably 
little public attention.  The existing records of the proceeding do not 
suggest that NAIC considered comments from any party other than the 
rating agencies themselves, who stated that their ratings should not be the 
sole basis of regulatory decisions.97  Rating agencies also spoke up to take 
issue with ACLI’s criticisms of their work.98 
                                                                                                                 
 93. ACLI Sept. 10, 2009 Letter, supra note 91, at 1. 
 94. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, RFP 1344—ASSESSMENT OF RESIDENTIAL 
MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES (RMBS), 9–14 (Oct. 23, 2009). 
 95. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, INTERIM REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE 
YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2010 2–3 (Dec. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/structured_securities_modeled_securities_instructions.pdf 
(detailing the modeling process adopted by the NAIC). 
 96. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, ESTIMATED RBC IMPACT FROM THE RMBS 
INITIATIVE 1 (Apr. 8, 2010), available at http://www.naic.org/rmbs/100408_ 
rbc_impact_estimate.pdf.  The NAIC’s RBC formula combines capital charges from various 
sources in a way that makes the total capital charge less than the sum of the individual 
capital charges.  Id. at 1–2.  The $5.4 billion figure cited in the text incorporates the charge-
reducing effect of this method, which is intended to compensate for the covariance of 
various risks.  Id.  Were it not for the "covariance adjustment," the NAIC’s change in 
methodology would have reduced the industry’s capital requirement by $7.3 billion.  Id. 
 97. See NAIC Proceedings 2009 4th Quarter, at 3-8 to -9, Minutes of Joint Executive 
Committee/Plenary Conference Call, Nov. 5, 2009 (referring only to rating agency 
comments in connection with adoption of proposal to change treatment of RMBS) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 98. See Debash Chatterjee et al., Special Report:  Moody’s Ratings on U.S. RMBS 
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ACLI’s point was sensible on its terms—the amount of loss, not the 
fact of default, seems to be what is relevant in deciding how much capital to 
require against a particular holding—but the problems about which ACLI 
complained seem to have been evident before the financial crisis.  ACLI did 
not claim that agencies changed their rating methodologies to focus on the 
first dollar of loss during the financial crisis, and it does not appear that the 
agencies did either.99  If ratings were an inappropriate way of measuring the 
credit risk of mortgage-backed securities in 2009, it seems that they were 
just as inappropriate in 2004.  What changed was not the usefulness of 
credit ratings as a regulatory tool, but rather the amount of capital that 
rating-dependent regulation required of the industry.  The change to the 
regulatory treatment of mortgage-backed securities seems to be an example 
of a rule bailout. 
The absence of public attention to the rule bailout of the insurance 
industry mirrors a larger pattern.  Bailouts that directly put government 
funds at risk—the direct injections of cash into the large banks, into the 
government-sponsored housing enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
and into AIG, GM, and Chrysler—triggered intense public rage and 
scrutiny.  Bailouts that simply helped regulated firms avoid regulatory 
consequences of the crisis, such as being forced to raise capital or being 
declared insolvent, were noticed mostly by financial commentators, if at all. 
The emphasis on the risk of taxpayer dollars is in some sense 
misplaced, as the direct dollar cost of those bailouts seems likely to be 
much less than the amount put at risk.100  More fundamentally, focusing on 
                                                                                                                 
Reflect Expected Recoveries: Ratings on Impaired Securities Do Not Overstate Risk, at 2 
(Nov. 6, 2009), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_rating_agency_ 
final_report.pdf (arguing that Moody’s ratings on high-yield bonds reflect expected loss on 
default, not just probability of default). 
 99. See, e.g., Richard Cantor, Strengthening Analytical Quality and Transparency, 
MOODY’S GLOBAL CREDIT POL’Y (Moody’s Inv. Serv., New York, N.Y.), Nov. 2009, at 5 
(describing the changes in analytical methodologies used in its structured finance ratings 
process for mortgage-backed securities); Joseph Snailer, Updates to Moody’s U.S. 
Structured Finance Rating Methodologies, (Moody’s Inv. Serv., New York, N.Y.), Apr. 1, 
2008, at 2–3 (describing Moody’s methodological changes since the beginning of the 
financial crisis without mentioning any change to the use of recovery rates in the residential 
MBS methodology). 
 100. As of March 2011, the latest date for which a systematic study is available, the 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that of $432 billion disbursed under the TARP 
program, which covered bailouts of banks, AIG, and auto manufacturers, as well as 
mortgage modification programs, there would be a net $19 billion loss to the government.  
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPORT ON THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM—MARCH 
2011, at 2 tbl.1 (2011).  The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimated a $64 
billion loss as of December 31, 2010, with most of the difference explained by the fact that 
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direct taxpayer losses misses what is probably the more important problem 
with bailouts:  They allow the bailed-out firm and those who dealt with it 
voluntarily to escape the consequences of failure.  Thus, they are unfair, 
they corrode the legitimacy of the system,101 and they may produce moral 
hazard—a willingness to take excessive risks because of the belief that the 
risks’ negative consequences will not materialize. 
These costs exist even for bailouts that don’t cost the taxpayer any 
money and even for bailouts that are "justified" in the sense that they avert 
economic loss.  That means that bailouts justified on a short-term dollars-
and-cents basis may not be justified from a broader perspective.  It also 
means that regulators should put a premium on avoiding situations in which 
bailouts seem to be needed.  
Rule bailouts specifically are quite tempting.  No regulator wants to 
watch its industry collapse on the regulator’s watch, and rule bailouts 
typically can be accomplished directly by the regulator, more or less behind 
the scenes, without howls of taxpayer protest.  The fact that rule bailouts 
can be accomplished with little public attention makes them attractive to the 
regulated as well as to the regulator:  A rule change that no one notices is 
far more attractive than a cash infusion that causes the regulated party to be 
pilloried in public.  Rule bailouts thus may induce more moral hazard than 
cash bailouts.102  The attitude in the boardroom might well be:  "Don’t 
worry; we can get the regulators to change the rule if we get into trouble, 
and no one will notice." 
Accordingly, the law has attempted to restrain rule bailouts.  After 
S&L regulators did a disastrous failed rule bailout of the thrift industry in 
the late 1980s, allowing insolvent S&Ls to double down on bigger and 
                                                                                                                 
OMB assumed much greater expenditures on mortgage programs.  See id. at 4 tbl.3. 
 101. Adam Levitin has argued that bailouts of some kind are inevitable and that the 
crucial issue is maximizing their political legitimacy.  Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of 
Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 439–40 (2011).  If, as Levitin suggests, bailouts were done 
transparently and included losses to the bailed-out firms’ trading partners, that certainly 
could increase their legitimacy.  Id. at 514 (concluding that bailouts must be conducted in 
transparent, politically accountable ways to ensure public legitimacy).  Rule bailouts, by 
contrast, typically are not meaningfully transparent (because they involve changes to obscure 
rules in little-noticed proceedings) and, in the short term, avoid losses to trading partners.  
Levitin does not explicitly address rule bailouts.  See id. at 503 (citing Steven M. Davidoff & 
David T. Zaring, Regulation by Deal:  The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 
61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 468 (2009)) (stating that in bailouts "agencies do not proceed using 
notice- and comment-rulemaking; instead, they proceed simply by doing deals").  In any 
event, the extent to which bailouts’ legitimacy can be increased is unknowable, and the 
extent to which their legitimacy should be increased is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 102. I thank Anupam Chander for this point. 
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bigger debts in an effort to get back into the black rather than enforcing 
regulatory requirements on the books,103 Congress enacted the FDIC 
Improvement Act, which requires S&L regulators to take "prompt 
corrective action" to deal with distressed banks.104  And, after highly 
publicized insurer failures around the same time, legislatures in every state 
(with the possible exception of Texas) adopted similar requirements for 
insurance regulators.105 
Nevertheless, regulators engaged in rule bailouts in response to the 
recent crisis.  Through the mid-2000s, insurers chose to rely on rating 
agency ratings to set capital requirements for their holdings, enjoying the 
benefits of so doing as agencies awarded high ratings to mortgage-backed 
and other structured securities.  When the agencies got around to 
downgrading huge waves of those securities in the financial crisis, insurers 
successfully pressured the NAIC to change the rules to avoid raising the 
corresponding capital.  Likewise, banks successfully pressured accounting 
regulators to allow them to avoid the negative effects of their regulatory 
choices:  Banks chose to hold assets in categories that had to be marked to 
market, enjoying the benefits of so doing as markets rose during the mid-
2000s.  When the market collapsed, banks successfully pressured the 
accounting regulators to change the rules to avoid recognizing the 
corresponding losses.106 
And the cycle of reaction against bailouts is repeating itself.  The 
centerpiece of Dodd-Frank is the "resolution authority" it confers on 
banking regulators, ostensibly so that they will not have to bail out large 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 292–99 (2008). 
 104. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2006); see also MISHKIN, supra note 103, at 299 (describing 
the prompt corrective action requirement as "[p]robably the most important feature" of post-
S&L reform legislation); Richard S. Carnell, Regulatory Incentives, in MAKE MARKETS BE 
MARKETS 35, 39 (Robert Johnson & Erica Payne eds., 2010) (describing prompt corrective 
action as an example of a "properly framed statutory standard[]" that "heighten[s] regulatory 
accountability and counteracts perverse incentives"). 
 105. See 3 NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES 312-1, § 6 (2011) 
(requiring state insurance commissioners to take control of insurers if capital falls below 
specified level).  Texas apparently permits, but does not require, regulatory action if an 
insurer does not maintain the required capital.  See TEX. INS. CODE § 822.211 (listing 
options which "the commissioner may enter" "[i]f an insurance company does not comply 
with the capital and surplus requirements of [a given chapter of the code]"); see also 3 NAIC 
MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES 312-1, State Adoption (2011) (reporting 
adoption of the Risk-Based Capital Model Act in every state but Texas). 
 106. See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 89, at 750 (noting that the push against mark-to-market 
accounting led to political pressure on the Securities and Exchange Commission to revise the 
rules). 
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banks in the future.107  But this approach seems unlikely to prevent either 
future rule bailouts or the conditions that lead to them:  industry-wide 
stresses, coupled with regulatory discretion in fashioning definitions and 
applying rules.  To be sure, some problems are simply so big that a rule 
bailout is ineffective and is therefore not tempting—no rule bailout would 
have saved Lehman Brothers or the bond insurers, so none was tried—but 
efforts to prevent rule bailouts where they are tempting seem no more 
likely to succeed now than they were in the past. 
VI.  The NAIC and the Limits of Capital Regulation 
The story here can be understood as an example of the cyclical 
distorting pressures of politics that affect any capital regulation system. 
When times are good, industry is strong and wants to take risks, and 
regulations are weakened.108  Here, the weakening took the form of 
removing the SVO’s ability to veto rating agency credit risk assessments.  
During a financial crash, regulators face tremendous pressure to insulate 
industry from the consequences of its previous risk-taking, because 
regulators don’t want to preside over collapse.  Here, regulators carried out 
a rule bailout of the life insurers.  After the crash, the will to regulate may 
return, at least for a time.  Here, that will has taken the form of 
reconsidering regulatory reliance on ratings in the insurance context. 
Any proposal for reforming capital regulation that does not take the 
political cycle into account is incomplete.  It is not clear, however, that it is 
possible to take this cycle into account adequately in financial regulation, as 
we see by briefly examining three possible approaches to dealing with the 
problem of the political cycle in capital regulation. 
The first is to constrain regulatory discretion, as some current 
proposals for reforming capital regulation suggest.  For example, Markus 
Brunnermeier and his co-authors propose that "regulation should be based 
on pre-set rules; otherwise, few regulator/supervisors will actually dare to 
face the odium of tightening in boom conditions."109  An example of a 
constraint intended to control regulators’ temptation to engage in  rule 
                                                                                                                 
 107. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 201–17 (comprising title II, "Orderly Liquidation 
Authority"). 
 108. See, e.g., Carnell, supra note 104, at 36–37 (describing pressure on banking 
regulators to be lax during expansionary period). 
 109. See, e.g., MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 37 (2009). 
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bailouts is the "prompt corrective action" requirement discussed 
previously.110 
The second approach is to strengthen the regulator or to strengthen 
regulation itself.  The regulator’s institutional independence theoretically 
could be strengthened, for example by making the SVO independent of 
industry funding.111  Capital requirements themselves could be 
strengthened, for example by simply increasing them.112 
Although there is nothing wrong with either of these approaches, they 
cannot address the larger problem because rules cannot effectively prohibit 
their own alteration.  The temptation to yield to a large, powerful financial 
industry in the face of an enormous boom will likely be great. 
A third method would be to try to deal with the timing problem with 
an ex post approach.  Rather than requiring regulators to decide in advance 
whether particular arrangements are acceptable, regulators could look at 
events in the light of outcomes and take appropriate action.   
For example, rather than having to decide (by application of capital 
requirements or otherwise) during a possible bubble whether a firm is 
taking excessive risk, a regulator could look at effects to make a decision 
about whether practices, investments, arrangements, etc. were acceptable.  
Victims of a crash could be compensated out of the gains of those who 
profited during the expansion.  One approach to this would be to give notice 
to market participants that even compensation that has already been paid 
will be at risk if a bubble collapses—to state categorically that it will not be 
out of bounds to go after payments like the AIG bonuses.113  If financial 
market participants are always going to be more informed and more 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing the prompt corrective 
action requirement). 
 111. One alternative to industry funding, funding through the legislative appropriation 
process, may pose its own threats to independence.  See Joan MacLeod Heminway, 
Sustaining Reform Efforts at the SEC:  A Progress Report, 30 No. 4 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. 
POL’Y REP. 1, 9-11 (2011) (arguing that implementation of Dodd-Frank reforms at SEC is 
vulnerable to Congressional underfunding). 
 112. Simply increasing capital levels may be "procyclical," that is, increase the 
volatility of economic output, in some circumstances.  See, e.g., Francisco Covas & Shigeru 
Fujita, Procyclicality of Capital Requirements in a General Equilibrium Model of Liquidity 
Dependence, 23 INT’L J. CENTRAL BANKING 137 (2010) (modeling procyclical effects of 
time-varying and constant capital requirements). 
 113. A counterpart to this approach, relying on private rights of action, is explored in 
Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks:  Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of 
Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368, 410–22 
(2009) (proposing a "doctrine of clawbacks" that would permit disgorgement of benefits to 
avoid unfair enrichment, even if benefits were conferred under a claim of right). 
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sophisticated than regulators, regulatory schemes that require regulators to 
understand market conditions and foresee effects are always going to be 
limited.  Allowing regulators to benefit from hindsight can, in principle, 
correct in part for this inequality. 
One might argue, of course, that regulators will indulge in hindsight 
bias, that market participants will not make smart decisions if they can’t be 
secure in profiting from them, and that it is simply immoral and/or lawless 
to redistribute in this way.  Although all these issues can be debated,114 the 
ex post approach is severely limited in practice by the fact that time moves 
in only one direction.  There is a limit to the extent to which regulators will 
be able to unwind completed transactions, locate funds that have been 
disbursed, and compensate victims; efforts to do justice in the wake of the 
Bernard Madoff scandal are just one recent, high-profile example.115 
The rule bailout of the insurance industry, together with the other rule 
bailouts of the financial crisis, suggests the possibility that what we can 
expect from the project of financial regulation may be limited.  To the 
extent we will continue to have a large, powerful financial sector, perhaps 
we must reconcile ourselves to living with its instabilities and with the 
unfairness of rule bailouts. 
                                                                                                                 
 114. For example, Anna Gelpern argues in implicit response to such criticisms that 
crisis containment is an enduring feature of global finance and that "some well-worn 
paradigms—sanctity of contracts, moral hazard, and the liquidity-solvency distinction—fall 
flat . . . consistently in crisis after crisis."  Id. at 1055.  Gelpern suggests that extraordinary 
crisis measures with redistributive consequences are inevitable and the best course is to 
make them as legitimate and accountable as possible.  See id. at 1106; see also Levitin, 
supra note 101, at 514 ("Bailouts . . . must be conducted in transparent, politically 
accountable ways to ensure public legitimacy, which is essential for their ultimate 
efficacy.").  On the specific issue of "sanctity of contract" and its relationship to financial 
crises and financial bubbles, contrast arguments for modifying contracts in crisis based on 
their negative effects, with arguments that widespread poor judgment in financial bubbles 
undermines bubble contracts at formation.  Compare Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, 
Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts:  Workout Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed 
Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1149–52 (2009) (making case for legislative 
modification of rigid securitization contracts based on spillover effects on the economy 
generally), with John Patrick Hunt, Taking Bubbles Seriously in Contract Law, 61 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 681, 684–85 (2011) (claiming "that the distinctive characteristics of bubbles 
make them inappropriate for private ordering, drawing on the contract doctrines of 
incapacity, mistake, and misrepresentation"). 
 115. See Bob Van Voris, For Madoff Victims, an Avenging Angel, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 14–20, 2011, at 38–40 (describing how Madoff trustee Irving Picard 
has recovered approximately $10 billion of the $65 billion purportedly in customer accounts 
when Madoff’s fraud was revealed in December 2008). 
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VII.  Conclusion 
Regulating a large and powerful industry is hard.  Assessing credit risk 
is also hard, and doing it right is expensive.  These factors combine to 
create strong pressure on regulators to rely on credit rating agencies or other 
outsourced credit monitors—even though regulatory reliance on credit 
ratings may undermine their usefulness in various ways.  The struggle 
playing out at the NAIC and at the federal level over removing ratings from 
regulation illustrates this dynamic.  
The NAIC could end rating-dependent regulation in insurance.  It 
could decide to  stop relying on external credit ratings, and strengthen its 
own internal capability.  The filing fees that are already in place supply a 
mechanism for doing this, although they might have to be much higher than 
they were when the NAIC first started to consider relying on agency ratings 
for capital requirements. 
Should the NAIC end rating-dependent regulation?  The cost is the 
development of an internal capability that is probably fairly expensive 
relative to the scale of the NAIC’s current operations.  The benefits include 
(potentially) better credit assessments.  They also include the possibility 
that eliminating rating-dependent insurance regulation will improve the 
quality of credit ratings for other users.  The latter is an externality to the 
insurance industry, so one would not expect it to receive adequate 
consideration in an industry-only process. 
What about the outsourced, non-rating agency alternative the NAIC 
has adopted for some securities such as RMBS?  Certainly it avoids the 
problem of rating-dependent insurance regulation hurting overall rating 
quality.  And it may well lead to better-quality assessments. 
Yet that proposition raises a different question.  Under the new system, 
the insurance industry, through its regulator, is paying for insurance-
specific assessments.  It is not saving money by using credit ratings that 
already exist.  Thus, if the industry is paying for these assessments anyway, 
why do so through an outside party?  Why pay PIMCO or BlackRock to do 
them rather than the SVO?  The decision raises the troubling prospect of 
indulging a pure "private good, government bad" preference. 
The NAIC has taken some useful steps relevant to the basic analytical 
question about use of credit ratings in regulation: How good or bad are 
credit ratings relative to other measures?  Nevertheless, the history of the 
use of credit ratings in insurance regulation to date raises the troubling 
prospect that industry power rather than analysis may determine the 
ultimate outcome. 

